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Abstract 
How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries differ in terms of market access 
and technology, and firms with market power differ in terms of productivity? We answer this question in a 
model of monopolistic competition in which variable markups increasing in firm size are a key source of 
misallocation across firms and countries. We use `disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, 
worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and production costs), and worse geography (in terms 
of more remoteness from other countries). We show that, in a global welfare perspective, optimal multilateral 
trade policy should: promote the sales of low cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; 
trim the sales of high cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduce firm entry in all 
countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore efficiency but also reduce welfare 
inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries if their differences in market size, state of 
technology and geography are large enough. 
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1 Introduction
How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of
market access and technology, and rms with market power di¤er in terms of productivity? Should
trade policy di¤er across countries? Should worse performing (national) rms be protected from bet-
ter performing (foreign) rivals? Should national product diversity be shielded against the potentially
disruptive e¤ects of cheaper imported goods? The answers to these questions crucially depend on
market structure, demand characteristics and technological constraints. In particular, in the canon-
ical models of monopolistic competition with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs,
xed production costs and constant marginal costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across rms,
the free market equilibrium is e¢cient and there is, therefore, no room for welfare improving policy
intervention: free trade is the best multilateral trade policy. More precisely, e¢ciency of the free
market outcome is granted in models in which there is only the monopolistically competitive sector.
When there is also another perfectly competitive (outside good) sector, the relative size of the mo-
nopolistically competitive sector is ine¢ciently small due to markup pricing. Yet, as the markup is the
same and constant across the monopolistic competitors, rms sizes are e¢cient in both absolute and
relative terms. This implies that the ine¢ciently small size of the monopolistically competitive sector
materializes entirely through an ine¢ciently small number of rms (see, e.g., Melitz and Redding,
2014 and 2015).
The aim of the present paper is to show how all this ceases to hold once the CES assumption
is removed, leading to new implications in terms of multilateral trade policy aimed at maximizing
the joint welfare of all trade partners.1 In doing so, we focus on a specic deviation from CES
known as Marshalls Second Law of Demand (MSLD), according to which demand becomes more
inelastic with consumption (Mrazova and Neary, 2013). As we discuss below, this assumption is
both theoretically and empirically appealing. We show that under MSLD the free trade allocation of
resources fails to be e¢cient in terms of product range, product selection and product mix with the
extent of misallocation varying across countries depending on market size, state of technology and
geography. For conciseness, we use advantaged (disadvantaged) to refer to countries with larger
(smaller) domestic market size, better (worse) state of technology in terms of lower (higher) innovation
and production costs, and better (worse) geography in terms of closer proximity to other countries.
Our ndings can then be summarized as follows. First, from a welfare point of view, too many
products are sold to advantaged countries and too few are sold to disadvantaged ones (ine¢cient
product range). Second, conditional on range, relatively too many high cost products are sold to any
country (ine¢cient product selection). This ine¢ciency is, however, more severe for disadvantaged
countries. Third, conditional on range and selection, the quantities of high cost products sold to any
country are too large and those of low cost products are too small (ine¢cient product mix). Also
this ine¢ciency is more severe for disadvantaged countries. As a result, the free market provides an
ine¢ciently high degree of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries if their
1Our aim is normative rather than positive: to inform rather than explain actual trade policy choices. This normative
focus also sets us apart from recent works that compare the gains from trade and the e¤ects of counterfactual trade
policies in quantitative trade models with rm heterogeneity in alternative demand and supply side setups (see, e.g.,
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012; Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014; Arkolakis et al, 2015; Jung,
Simonovska and Weinberger, 2015; Bertoletti, Etro and Simonovska, 2016).
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di¤erences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough. There is, therefore,
room for welfare improving multilateral policy intervention that: increases sales of low cost rms to all
countries but especially to disadvantaged ones; decreases sales of high cost rms to all countries but
especially to disadvantaged ones; reduces rm entry in all countries but especially in disadvantaged
ones.
In our analytical framework market ine¢ciency stems from four types of externalities (Nocco,
Ottaviano and Salto, 2014; Behrens et al, 2016; Dhingra and Morrow, 2019). First, rms neglect
their impact on product variety. Due to love of variety, the product range enters utility as a direct
utility-enhancing argument on top of the quantities consumed. This acts as a driver towards too few
varieties. Second, by keeping price above marginal cost, rms leave too much room for entry. This
acts as a driver towards too many varieties. Third, rms neglect the negative impact of their entry
on rivals prots. This also acts as a driver towards too many varieties. These three externalities
are the traditional ones already highlighted in earlier models of monopolistic competition (Spence,
1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and operate also when rms are not heterogeneous. Their net e¤ect on
product range is generally ambiguous depending on the cross-elasticities of demand. A special case
arises with CES demand: the opposite externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market
outcome is e¢cient (without the outside good). The introduction of rm heterogeneity does not
alter this property as CES demand implies the same constant markup for all rms so that also the
product mix is e¢cient (Melitz and Redding, 2015). The presence of a fourth type of externality is
tied to MSLD as, with MSLD but not with CES, rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver
of ine¢ciency. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is reected in larger
markups for rms with lower marginal cost. As a result, these rms do not fully trasmit their cost
advantage to prices. By softening competition, this generates a positive externality in favor of rms
with higher marginal cost. The externality works at both the intensive and the extensive margins. At
the intensive margin, higher marginal cost rms are ine¢ciently large relative to lower marginal costs
rms. At the extensive margin, by keeping price above marginal cost more than their higher marginal
cost rivals, lower marginal cost rms leave ine¢ciently larger room for entry.
Analyzing the MSLD case is important in many respects both theoretically and empirically. As
pointed out by Mrazova and Neary (2013), Marshall (1920) argues this case represents the normal
behavior of demand, an opinion shared also by Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman
(1979). Subsequent studies have vindicated this view. MSLD plays a crucial role for some of the
key traditional (non-CES) implications of trade models with monopolistic competition, including:
pro-competitive e¤ects, through which trade liberalization reduces rms markups (Krugman, 1979);
pricing to market, through which rms set c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to rather than
simply setting a single f.o.b. price in the market they sell from (Krugman, 1987); dumping, through
which rms accept a lower prot margin per unit sold in foreign than in home markets (Brander
and Krugman, 1983); and incomplete pass through, through which di¤erences in rms production
costs traslate in less than proportionate price di¤erences (Dornbusch, 1987).2 MSLD also underpins
some newer implications of those models in the presence of rm heterogeneity. In particular, better
2While some of these properties have been initially discussed in the case of oligopoly, later studies have shown that
they also hold in the case of monopolistic competition under MSLD. See, e.g., Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002)
and the discussion in Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016).
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performing rms (those with lower marginal cost and larger market shares) are predicted to set higher
markups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2014 and 2016).3 Last but not
least, several of the implications of MSLD are supported by mounting empirical evidence on rm
performance based on price data (Berman, Martin and Mayer, 2012; De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014;
De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik, 2016) as well as on revenue data (Mayer, Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2014 and 2016).4
We perform our normative analysis of the free market outcome within the general equilib-
rium framework proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This model with an outside good and
quasi-linear quadratic utility exhibits several features useful for our purposes.5 As it exhibits linear
demand, it satises MSLD and thus features pro-competitive e¤ects, pricing to market, dumping, and
incomplete pass-through as well as higher markups for better performing rms.6 As it is analytically
solvable with asymmetries in market size, technology and accessibility for an arbitrary number of
countries, it allows for transparent comparative statics in a multi-country setup. As the marginal
utility of income is constant and utility is transferable, it allows for a consistent e¢ciency analysis
based on a straightforward denition of global welfare for an economy with heterogeneous countries
as the sum of all individuals indirect utilities. While one may note that the absence of income e¤ects
gives our investigation some partial equilibrium avor, the framework still shares its focus on social
surplus with a large body of trade policy analyses that abstract from distributive issues (Bagwell and
Staiger, 2016).7
Our analysis contributes to three main literatures. The rst is the literature on optimal trade
policy under imperfect competition (Grossman and Helpman, 1989; Grossman, 1992).8 This literature
usually does not feature more than two countries. Its ndings with homogeneous rms are summarized
by Felbermayr, Jung and Larch (2013): tari¤s can correct for the distortion due to markup pricing
(Flam and Helpman, 1987); tari¤s can induce welfare-enhancing additional entry (Venables, 1987);
tari¤s can improve the terms of trade (Gros, 1987).9 With CES demand and monopolistic competition
3Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) show that MSLD entails an increasing relationship between output and markup,
and thus the level of pass-through. They also show that, when a stronger restriction (which they call MSLD) holds, there
is an additional connection between changes in output and changes in markups, and thus di¤erences in pass-through:
the pass-through rate is lower for better than for worse performing rms. Specically, MSLD requires marginal revenue
to become more inelastic with consumption and this implies MLSD.
4Due to its far-reaching implications, MSLD has also attracted renewed interest in the contemporary debate on
the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects of trade liberalization, though often disguised under di¤erent headings: log-
concavity in log-prices (Arkolakis et al, 2015); sub-convexity (Neary and Mrazova, 2013); increasing relative love
of variety (Zhelobodko et al, 2012); decreasing elasticity of substitution (Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014); Adjustable
pass-through (Fabinger and Weyl, 2014). See Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) for a discussion of mappings between
these concepts.
5 Irrespective of quasi-linearity, as pointed out by Ossa (2011), models with a freely traded outside good generate
a perfectly elastic labor supply curve and thus isolate the e¤ects of trade policies on rm location. Models with no
outside good generate, instead, a perfectly inelastic labor supply curve and hence isolate the e¤ects of trade policy on
the terms of trade.
6As linear demand also satises MSLD, it also features lower pass-through rate for better performing rms (Mayer,
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2016).
7The assumption of quasi-linear utility, under which income transfers are utility transfers, is also frequently made in
political economy models of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
8For a recent overview of optimal trade policy under perfect competition, see the introductory discussion in Costinot,
Donaldson, Vogel and Werning (2015).
9Flam and Helpman (1987), Gros (1987) and Venables (1987) all rely on variants of the CES two-country model
by Krugman (1980). In a multi-country set-up involving the six major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations
(Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US), Ossa (2011) shows that a calibrated version of that model predicts
noncooperative tari¤s of the same order of magnitude as the tari¤s observed during the tari¤ war following Smoot-
Hawley.
4
à la Krugman (1980) the incentives for a non-cooperative trade policy arise from the desire to eliminate
monopolistic distortions and to improve domestic terms of trade (Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati,
2014). More recently, rm heterogeneity has been introduced in models of monopolistic competition.
When demand is CES as in Melitz (2003) and tari¤s are either set unilaterally by a small open
economy (Demidova and Rodriguez-Claire, 2009; Haaland and Venables, 2016) or by a large open
economy facing another large open economy (Felbermayr, Jung and Larch, 2013), trade barriers have
benecial e¤ects on the protectionist country. By raising the countrys wage, an import tari¤ produces
an improvement in its terms-of-trade. When product variety is ine¢ciently poor, a tari¤ on imports,
or a subsidy to domestic sales, increases the number of varieties o¤ered by the market also correcting
the mark-up distortion. Costinot, Rodriguez-Clare and Werning (2016) analyze the e¤ects of rm-
specic unilateral intervention by a large open economy and show that its welfare is maximized by
optimal import taxes that discriminate against the most protable foreign exporters and optimal
export taxes that are uniform across domestic exporters. Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati (2018)
show that with two large countries the Nash equilibrium when both domestic and trade policies are
available is characterized by rst-best-level labor subsidies that achieve production e¢ciency, and
ine¢cient import subsidies and export taxes that aim at improving domestic terms of trade. Non-
CES demand à la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is considered by Bagwell and Lee (2015), who show
that in the case of two symmetric countries there is an incentive for a country to introduce a small
unilateral import tari¤. They also identify the conditions under which two symmetric countries have
unilateral incentives to introduce beggar-thy-neighbor export subsidies. Moreover, in the case of
symmetric trade policies, they nd that global free trade is generally ine¢cient. Within the same
framework but without the outside good, Demidova (2017) shows that a unilateral reduction in a
wasteful import tari¤ (i.e. a frictional tari¤ that does not generate any tax revenue) increases the
protectionist countrys welfare both in the case of two large economies and in the case of a small open
economy. Di¤erently, when the import tari¤ is non-wasteful (i.e. it generates tax revenues as in the
other foregoing studies), in both cases unilateral trade liberalization reduces the countrys welfare.
Our contribution to this literature is the analysis of multilateral trade policy with heterogeneous rms
for an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries that cooperatively maximize global welfare when
demand is non-CES. For completeness we also investigate the incentives for a country to deviate from
multilateral cooperation: they are consistent with the tradeo¤s already highlighted by the existing
literature on unilateral trade policy.10
The second literature we contribute to studies optimal product variety in models of monopolistic
competition without rm heterogeneity (Spence, 1976, and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and with rm
heterogeneity (Melitz and Redding, 2014; Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014 and 2017; Dhingra and
Morrow, 2019). This literature focuses on a closed (or perfectly integrated) economy or on open
economies with symmetric countries.11 We extend this literature by investigating the role of country
asymmetries in terms of market size, geographical barriers to trade and state of technology.
10Ossa (2014) studies noncooperative and cooperative trade policy in a calibrated multi-country multi-industry general
equilibrium model with inter-industry trade in the Ricardian tradition as well as intra-industry trade in the wake of
Krugman (1980) and thus with CES demand. The model is richer than ours but cannot be solved analytically for an
arbitrary number of asymmetric countries. A recent overview of the economics literature on trade agreements, under
perfect and imperfect competition, can be found in Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2016).
11See, e.g., Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2017) for a discussion of the main developments in this literature, and for a
study of the impact of di¤erent degrees of rm heterogeneity on the extent of market ine¢ciencies.
5
Third and last, we contribute to the growing literature on misallocation in the wake of Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), who use a closed economy CES model of monopolistic competition to show how
output and capital distortions give rise to wedges in marginal revenue products between rms, and
how the welfare losses from those distortions can be quantied through the measurement of the
corresponding wedges.12 As discussed by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014), trade policies fall nicely
into this framework. While output tari¤s and subsidies distort output markets due to their e¤ects
on competition, input tari¤s and subsidies directly distort capital and intermediates markets. With
CES demand and no outside good, reducing these distortions through trade liberalization necessarily
improves welfare through a more e¢cient allocation of resources across rms. Our contribution to this
literature is to show that, when demand is non-CES, free trade is not e¢cient and trade liberalization
does not necessarily improve welfare. In particular, with asymmetric countries there are situations in
which trade liberalization may actually increase the misallocation of resources towards less productive
rms and countries.13 This can happen because the global welfare maximizing trade policy is not free
trade.14
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3
derives the free market outcome. Section 4 characterizes the e¢cient outcome. Section 5 compares the
two outcomes, discussing the ine¢ciency of the former in terms of product range, product selection
and product mix. It also analyzes the sources of the ine¢ciencies and the implications of the two
outcomes for international inequality. Section 6 describes the rst best multilateral trade policies that
can be implemented to attain e¢ciency at the market equilibrium when policy tools are unconstrained.
It also discusses second and third best policies when there are constraints on available tools. Section
7 looks at unilateral deviation from the e¢cient outcome. Section 8 concludes.
2 Multi-Country Economy
We follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008, Appendix) and consider a global economy consisting of M
countries, indexed by l = 1; :::;M . Country l is populated by Ll consumers, each endowed with one
unit of labor, inelastically supplied in a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences of consumers
in l are dened over a traditional homogeneous good 0 and a continuum of varieties of a horizontally
di¤erentiated modern good. We use 
l to denote this continuum and index varieties by i 2 
l. All
12See Hopenhayn (2014) for a recent appraisal of the broader literature on the role that rm heterogeneity and the
allocation of resources across rms play in determining aggregate productivity.
13There are very few contributions that explicitly look at misallocation through the lenses of the markup hetero-
geneity implied by non-CES demand. Epifani and Gancia (2011) focus on heterogeneity across industries, and thus
on between-industry misallocation, relying on a reduced-form markup function that encompasses di¤erent underlying
model structures (including Bernard et al., 2003; Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). They show
that in a symmetric multi-country open economy model trade can a¤ect (and in some cases reduce) welfare by changing
the cross-sectoral dispersion of market power. See also Holmes, Hsu and Lee (2014) and Edmond, Midrigan and Xu
(2015). Peters (2018) proposes a closed-economy dynamic model of rm growth that generates an endogenous within-
industry stationary (Pareto) distribution of markups. The model is applied to the study of the e¤ects that barriers to
entry and product market expansion have on aggregate productivity through changes in the markup distribution.
14This is a classical second-best welfare result in the tradition of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963). See Srinivasan
(1996) for an appraisal of the ensuing literature.
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consumers share the same utility function
Ul = q
"
0l + 
Z
i2
l
q"l (i) di 
1
2

Z
i2
l
(q"l (i))
2
di 
1
2

Z
i2
l
q"l (i) di
2
; (1)
where q"0l and q
"
l (i) refer to the individual consumption levels of the traditional good and variety i
of the modern good respectively. Parameters ,  and  are all positive:  is a measure of love for
variety;  and  capture the intensity of preferences for the modern good relative to the traditional
one. All consumers have an initial endowment q"0l of the traditional good, which is assumed to be
large enough for its consumption to be strictly positive.
Labor is the only input. It is employed in the production of the traditional good under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It is also employed
in the production of the modern good under monopolistic competition with a one-to-one relation
between rms and varieties. In country l the supply of a variety of this good faces two type of costs:
a sunk innovation requirement of fl > 0 units of labor to design the blueprint of the variety; and a
production requirement of c units of labor per unit of output. The latter is drawn from a continuous
distribution with cumulative density function
Gl(c) =

c
cM;l
k
, c 2 [0; cM;l]: (2)
This corresponds to the usual case in which marginal productivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with
shape parameter k  1 over the support [1=cM;l;1). For k = 1 the distribution is uniform on its
support [0; cM;l]. As k rises, density is skewed towards the upper bound of the support. In the limit,
as k goes to innity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cM;l. Together with fl, cM;l denes the
state of technology in country l. Comparing the cumulative density functions Gl(c) and Gh(c) of two
countries l and h with the same shape parameter k but di¤erent supports cM;l < cM;h shows that the
former rst-order stochastically dominates the latter as it cumulates more density on the lower part
of the overlapping segment of the supports. Accordingly, given that the traditional goods unit labor
requirement equals one, cM;h=cM;l > 1 can be interpreted as a measure of country ls comparative
advantage in the production of the modern good with respect to country h.
Exchange of varieties of the modern good is hampered by iceberg frictions for international
shipments:  lh > 1 units have to be shipped from country l for one unit to arrive in country h 6= l.
These frictions are determined by geographical and technological factors. Crucially, they are not trade
policy variables. National shipments do not face, instead, any friction ( ll = 1).
3 Market Outcome
In the equilibrium consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, rms maximize
prots subject to their technological constraints (for both production and trade), and all markets
clear. Choosing the traditional good as numeraire, perfect competition in its market together with
free trade implies that both its price and the wage of workers equal one in all countries.15 Quasi-
15Unit wage allows us to interpret the parameters of input requirements as costs, which we will do henceforth.
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linearity of utility (1) then implies that workers decide how much to spend of their unit wage on the
varieties of the modern good, leaving whatever residual budget to the consumption of the traditional
good. The rst order condition for utility maximization gives individual inverse demand for variety i
pl (i) =   q
"
l (i)  Q
"
l ; (3)
for q"l (i)  0, with pl (i) denoting the price of variety i in country l and Q
"
l =
R
i2
l
q"l (i) di denoting
total individual demand of the di¤erentiated varieties. Aggregation of (3) across consumers leads to
aggregate demand of variety i in country l
ql (i)  q
"
l (i)Ll =
Ll
Nl + 
 
Ll

pl (i) +
Nl
Nl + 
Ll

pl 8i 2 
;l; (4)
where the set 
;l is the largest subset of 
l such that demand in l is positive for variety i, Nl is the
measure (number) of varieties in 
;l (given by the sum of domestic and imported varieties), and
pl = (1=Nl)
R
i2
;l
pl (i) di is their average price. Variety i belongs to this set when
pl (i) 
1
Nl + 
(+ Nlpl)  p
max
l ; (5)
where pmaxl   represents the price at which demand for a variety in l is driven to zero.
3.1 Product Mix
Turning to modern rms, pricing to market arises from price discrimination on a geographical basis
with rms setting c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to.16 We use qlh(c) to denote the quantity sold
in country h by a rm producing in country l at marginal cost c and plh(c) to denote the corresponding
c.i.f. price (h = l refers to domestic transactions). Maximization of prots earned from sales to h are
achieved for qlh(c) equal to
qmlh(c) =
(
Lh
2  lh (c
m
lh   c) if c  c
m
lh 
pmaxh
 lh
= 1 lh

  
Qmh
Lh

0 if c > cmlh
(6)
where m labels the free market equilibrium values of the variables and
Qmh 
MX
l=1
 
NE;l
Z cmlh
0
qmlh(c)dGl(c)
!
is the total quantity of modern good sold in country h with NE;l denoting the number of entrants
in country l. Expression (6) denes a cuto¤ rule as only entrants in country l with low enough
marginal cost (c  cmlh) sell their variety to country h. For them, the prot-maximizing c.i.f. price is
16 International price discrimination had been the traditional denition of dumping before 1974, when the denition
was extended to include sales below cost (see, e.g., Kolev and Prusa, 2002, for a discussion). Nowadays the legal
denition of dumping has little to do with any economic notion of dumping (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003).
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pmlh(c) =  lh (c
m
lh + c) =2, which implies markup 
m
lh(c) =  lh (c
m
lh   c) =2 and maximized prot
lh(c) =
Lh
4
( lh)
2
(cmlh   c)
2
: (7)
Equation (6) implies  lhc
m
lh = hhc
m
hh = p
max
h and thus the cuto¤s for domestic and foreign sellers in
h are linked by the relation
cmlh =
cmhh
 lh
(8)
for l; h = 1; ::::;M given hh = 1.
These results show that, conditional on the country they produce in (l) and the country they
sell to (h), rms with lower marginal cost c sell more output qmlh(c) than higher cost rms as their price
pmlh(c) is lower despite higher markup 
m
lh(c)  and the more so the lower the marginal cost cuto¤ c
m
lh.
This leads to higher prot lh(c). Considering two rms with di¤erent marginal costs c and c
0 with
c < c0, their relative price pmlh(c)=p
m
lh(c
0) = (cmlh + c) = (c
m
lh + c
0) is larger than their relative marginal
cost c=c0, the more so the larger the cuto¤ cmlh.
17 . Given  lh > 1, c
m
lh < c
m
hh implies that marginal
sellers to h have lower marginal cost if they are foreign than if they are domestic.
3.2 Product Selection
Due to free entry, in equilibrium expected prot for an entrant in country l is exactly o¤set by the
sunk cost fl. Given (2), (7), (8) and hh = 1, this free entry condition can be stated as a function
of the cuto¤s for domestic sellers only:
MX
h=1
Lhlh (c
m
hh)
k+2
= 2 (k + 2) (k + 1) fl (cM;l)
k
: (9)
where lh  ( lh)
 k
is an inverse measure of trade frictions from l to h (trade freeness) ranging
between 0 for prohibitive international frictions and 1 for frictionless national trade ( ll = 1). Together
with analogous conditions for the other M   1 countries, (9) yields a system of M equations that can
be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cuto¤s
cmll =
8>>><
>>>:
2 (k + 1) (k + 2)
Ll
MP
h=1
h
fh (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
jP j
9>>>=
>>>;
1
k+2
(10)
for l = 1; :::;M , where jP j is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix P = [hl](h=1;:::;M ;l=1;:::;M),
jChlj is the cofactor of its hl element and fh (cM;h)
k
inversely measures the quality of the state of
17Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we can dene rm TFP revenue for sales from l to h in the free market
outcome as TFPRm
lh
(c)  pm
lh
(c)=c =
 
 lh + c
m
hh
=c

=2. Then, comparing two rms with marginal costs c and c0 with
c < c0, we have TFPRm
lh
(c) > TFPRm
lh
(c0). As TFPRm
lh
(c) and TFPRm
lh
(c0) are not equalized, there is misallocation
of resources. In particular, TFPRm
lh
(c) > TFPRm
lh
(c0) implies that the low (high) cost rm is allocated too little (much)
labor.
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technology in country h in terms of both innovation (fh) and production (cM;h).
18 The expression of
the domestic cuto¤ (10) can be decomposed into two multiplicative components
cmall 
"
2 (k + 1) (k + 2) fl (cM;l)
k
Ll
# 1
k+2
(11)
and
Cll 
(
1
jP j
MX
h=1
"
fh
fl

cM;h
cM;l
k
jChlj
#) 1
k+2
(12)
such cmll = c
ma
ll Cll. The rst component c
ma
ll corresponds to the cuto¤ that would materialize if
trade frictions were prohibitive. This autarkic cuto¤ is determined by own market size Ll and
state of technology fl (cM;l)
k
, with lower cmall associated with larger market size (larger Ll), lower
innovation cost (smaller fl) and stronger comparative advantage (smaller cM;h) in the modern good.
The second component Cll is, instead, trade-related and combines market access, ease of innovation
and comparative advantage. Better accessibility to foreign markets (i.e. higher centrality in the trade
network dened by P ), lower innovation cost (larger fh=fl), and higher probability of low cost draws
in production (larger (cM;h=cM;l)
k
) lead to a lower Cll. The second component equals 1 when country
l is autarkic; it is positive but smaller than 1 otherwise as long as the trade freeness matrix satises the
triangle inequality and there is some production of the modern good in all countries.19 This implies
cmll < c
ma
ll : product selection is stronger with trade than in autarky.
To summarize, rm selection in the modern sector is stronger (cmll is smaller) in countries that
have larger market size (larger Ll) as well as better state of technology in terms of both innovation
(smaller fl) and production (smaller cM;l), and that have better access to trade partners (as dictated
by P ). These are all factors that foster rm entry and make competition tougher. Henceforth, for
conciseness, we will refer to such countries as advantaged and to the others as disadvantaged. For
a given value of the cuto¤, advantaged countries are more attractive to entrants as these anticipate
higher prots in case of survival. The cuto¤ is, therefore, lower in such countries to reduce the
probability of survival and make rms indi¤erent about which country to enter by equalizing their
expected prots before entering to zero everywhere.
3.3 Product Range
To complete the characterization of the free market outcome, we need to pin down the equilibrium
numbers of entrants (NE;l), producers (NP;l) and sellers (Nl) in each country. For the number
of sellers (which determines the product range), we can use cmlh  p
max
h = lh from (6), p
max
l =
18We focus on situations in which the modern sector is active in all countries. This is indeed the case as long as
MP
h=1
h
fh
 
cM;h
k
jChlj
i
= jP j > 0 holds for all l = 1; :::;M . Given  lh >  ll = 1, that condition also implies c
m
ll
> cm
lh
so
that marginal exporters have lower marginal cost than marginal producers.
19The trade freeness matrix P saties the triangle inequality as long as hl  hnnl for all h; l; n = 0; :::;M . When
it does, modern production takes place everywhere (Cll > 0 for all l = 0; :::;M) as long as the cross-country variation
of fl, cM;l and hl is not too pronounced. The argument for Cll < 1 is detailed in Appendix A.
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(+ Nlpl) = (Nl + ) from (5), and p
m
l = f(2k + 1) = [2 (k + 1)]g c
m
ll due to (2) to obtain
Nml =
2 (k + 1)

  cmll
cmll
(13)
for l = 1; :::;M . The key result here is that product variety is richer in countries with lower cmll . Given
(10), these are the advantaged countries. Hence, as in these countries consumers face not only lower
prices (as already discussed) but also richer product variety, welfare is higher as captured by indirect
utility
Uml = 1 + q
"
0l +
1
2
(  cmll )

 
k + 1
k + 2
cmll

: (14)
Finally, to nd the equilibrium number of entrants, it is useful to note that the number of sellers
from country h to country l equals Nhl = NE;hGh(chl) (i.e. the share of entrants with marginal cost
lower than the cuto¤) so that, given (2), (8) and Nl =
PM
h=1Nhl, the equilibrium number of sellers in
l also evaluates to Nml =
PM
h=1 hlNE;h (c
m
ll =cM;h)
k
. This can be combined with (13) to obtain, for
l = 1; :::;M , a system ofM linear equations that can be solved for the equilibrium number of entrants
NmE;l =
2 (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
MP
h=1
h
(  cmhh) (c
m
hh)
 (k+1)
jClhj
i
 jP j
: (15)
The corresponding equilibrium number of producers is then given by NmP;l = N
m
E;l (c
m
ll =cM;l)
k
.
4 Globally E¢cient Outcome
To evaluate the e¢ciency of the free market outcome we consider the problem faced by a benevolent
social planner who maximizes global welfare taking as given, for each country l, the endowment of
labor Ll, the endowment of the traditional good q0l = q
"
0lLl, trade frictions and the production
functions of the two goods. In the case of the modern good, this means that the planner takes as
given the mechanism determining each varietys unit labor requirement c as a random draw from the
distribution Gl(c) after fl units of labor have been allocated to the design of that variety. As the quasi-
linearity of (1) implies transferable utility, global welfareW can be expressed as the sum of consumers
utilities across all countries: W =
PM
h=1 UlLl. For each country l the planners choice variables are
then: the quantity of the traditional good (q0l = q
"
0lL
l); the number of varieties designed (NE;l);
and the quantity of each variety earmarked by country of production l and country of consumption h
(qlh(c) = q
"
lhLh).
Accordingly, the planners program can be summarized as
max
fq0l;NE;l;qlh(c)gj
M
l=1
W =
MX
l=1
UlLl; (16)
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subject to the resource constraint
q0l + flNE;l +NE;l
MX
h=1
Z cM;l
0
 lhcqlh(c)dGl(c)

= q0l + Ll (17)
for l = 1; :::;M and with  ll = 1. In (17) the third term on the left hand side is overall labor em-
ployment in the production of the modern good in country l, taking the distribution of c and iceberg
frictions  lh into account. Analogously, given (1), in UlLl we can use
PM
h=1NE;h
R cM;h
0
qhl(c)dGh(c)
and
PM
h=1NE;h
R cM;h
0

qhl(c)L
l
2
dGh(c) to substitute for
R
i2
l
ql (i) di and
R
i2
l
(ql (i))
2
di respec-
tively.
4.1 Product Mix
The rst order condition with respect to qlh(c) gives
qolh(c) =
(
Lh
  lh (c
o
lh   c) c  c
o
lh with c
o
lh 
1
 lh

  
Qoh
Lh

0 c > colh
(18)
where o labels the e¢cient values of the variables and Qoh 
PM
l=1

NE;l
R colh
0
qolh(c)dGl(c)

. Hence,
just like the free market, also the planner follows a cuto¤ rule: only varieties with low enough unit labor
requirement (c  colh) are produced in country l for consumption in country h. Analogously, conditional
on the countries of production and consumption, varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are
supplied in larger amounts than varieties with lower c, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in the country
of consumption. E¢cient quantity qolh(c) would clear the market in a decentralized scenario only if
each producer in l priced the quantity sold in h at marginal delivered cost polh(c) =  lhc.
20 Result
(18) also implies that the relation of the optimal cuto¤ for marginal varieties consumed and produced
in h with that for varieties consumed in h but produced in l is regulated by
colh =
cohh
 lh
(19)
for l; h = 1; ::::;M . The relation is, therefore, the same as for the free market equilibrium (see (8)),
even though the cuto¤s are di¤erent as we now show.
4.2 Product Selection
The cuto¤s of the planner are derived from the rst order conditions of the planners problem with
respect to NE;l. These require
MX
h=1
Lhlh (c
o
hh)
k+2
=  (k + 2) (k + 1) fl (cM;l)
k
(20)
20This can be seen by substituting plh(c) = p
o
lh
(c) =  lhc in the inverse demand function plh(c) =   qlh(c)=Lh  
Qo
h
=Lh and using the denition  lhc
o
lh
=   Qo
h
=Lh to obtain qlh(c) = q
o
lh
(c) =  lh
 
co
lh
  c

Lh=. Given p
o
lh
(c) =
 lhc, we can dene TFPR
o
lh
(c)  po
lh
(c)=c =  lh. Hence, TFPR
o
lh
(c) is the same for all rms selling from l to h and
there is thus no misallocation in the sense of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). See Footnote 17 on misallocation at the free
market outcome.
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for l = 1; ::::;M , generating a system of M equations that can be solved for the M optimal domestic
cuto¤s
coll =
8>>><
>>>:
 (k + 1) (k + 2)
Ll
MP
h=1
h
fh (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
jP j
9>>>=
>>>;
1
k+2
(21)
for l = 1; :::;M .21 Accordingly, also the expression of the optimal cuto¤ can be decomposed into the
product of an autarkic component
coall 
"
 (k + 1) (k + 2) fl (cM;l)
k
Ll
# 1
k+2
(22)
and the trade-related component Cll dened in (12) with c
o
ll = c
oa
ll Cll. As in the free market outcome,
e¢cient product selection is stricter (coll is smaller) in advantaged countries. As the trade-related
component is identical to the free market one and is therefore smaller than 1 with trade, we have
coll < c
oa
ll : also in the e¢cient outcome product selection is stronger with trade than in autarky.
4.3 Product Range
As for the number of varieties sold (and thus the product range), we can use the denition of colh
from (18), the relation between colh and c
o
hh from (19), and the expression for Q
o
h obtained using (18)
together with (2) in its denition to get
Nol =
 (k + 1)

  coll
coll
(23)
for l = 1; :::;M . As the e¢cient number of varieties consumed in l also evaluates toNol =
PM
h=1 hlN
o
E;h (c
o
ll=cM;h)
k
,
this expression can be combined with (23) to obtain, for l = 1; :::;M , a system of M linear equations
that can be solved for the e¢cient number of varieties designed
NoE;l =
 (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
MP
h=1
h
(  cohh) (c
o
hh)
 (k+1)
jClhj
i
 jP j
(24)
with l = 1; :::;M . The corresponding e¢cient number of varieties produced in l is then given by
NoP;l = N
o
E;l (c
o
ll=cM;l)
k
. Analogously to the free market outcome, product variety is richer (Nol is
larger) in countries with lower coll. Given (21), these are again the advantaged countries. Since
indirect utility can be written as
Uol = 1 + q
"
0l +
1
2
(  coll)
2
; (25)
21For the market outcome we focused on situations in which the modern sector is active in all countries, which requires
MP
h=1
h
fh
 
cM;h
k
jChlj
i
= jP j > 0 to hold for all l = 1; :::;M . This condition implies that the same happens also in the
e¢cient outcome. Given  lh > hh = 1, it also implies c
o
ll
> co
lh
so that marginal exporters have lower marginal cost
than marginal producers.
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such countries enjoy higher welfare.
5 Market Failure
We are now ready to compare the free market and e¢cient outcomes in terms of product selection,
product mix and product range.
5.1 Product Selection
Product selection is determined by cuto¤ (10) in the free market case and by cuto¤ (21) in the e¢cient
case. Accordingly, the gap between the two evaluates to
cmll   c
o
ll =

2
1
k+2   1

coll: (26)
As this shows that cmll is larger than c
o
ll, the planner is more selective than the free market: the share
of varieties designed but not produced by the planner is larger than the share of entrants that do not
produce in equilibrium. In particular, varieties with c 2 (coll; c
m
ll ] are supplied by the free market but
should not be produced from an e¢ciency viewpoint. The length of the interval of ine¢ciency cmll  c
o
ll
decreases as coll falls. It is, therefore, shorter in advantaged countries. Hence, these countries in the
free market outcome not only enjoy higher welfare, but are also less ine¢cient in terms of product
selection. Vice versa, disadvantaged countries face not only lower welfare but also more ine¢cient
product selection at the free market outcome.
Ine¢cient selection also materializes in terms of exports. Using (10), (21), (8) and (19) allows
us to write the gap between the export cuto¤s as
cmlh   c
o
lh =

2
1
k+2   1

colh =

2
1
k+2   1
 cohh
 lh
;
which implies colh < c
m
lh. Hence, the share of varieties produced but not exported is larger for the
planner than for the free market. Specically, varieties with c 2 (colh; c
m
lh] are exported in the free
market outcome but they should not be exported on e¢ciency grounds. Conditional on bilateral
friction  lh, this ine¢ciency is more severe in export countries with larger cuto¤ c
o
hh. These are
disadvantaged countries that not only produce an ine¢ciently larger share of varieties they design,
but also import an ine¢ciently large share of varieties produced elsewhere. On the other hand,
conditional on the destination countrys cuto¤ cohh, the ine¢ciency is more pronounced for shipments
to destinations associated with lower  lh and thus easier to reach.
5.2 Product Mix
Turning to output, comparing the free market outcome from (6) with the e¢cient outcome from (18)
gives the quantity gap
qmlh(c)  q
o
lh(c) =
Lh
2
 lh
h
c 

2  2
1
k+2

colh
i
;
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which implies that qmlh(c) is larger than q
o
lh(c) if and only if c is larger than c
m=o
lh 
 
2  21=(k+2)

colh.
As this threshold falls in the e¢cient selection interval [0; colh], the free market provides ine¢ciently
small quantities of varieties with unit labor requirement below c
m=o
lh , and ine¢ciently large quantities
of varieties with unit input requirement above c
m=o
lh . All the rest given, ine¢ciency is larger the further
away a varietys unit input requirement c is from the threshold. Clearly, qmlh(c) is larger than q
o
lh(c)
also for c 2 (colh; c
m
lh]. In this case, as discussed above, the free market quantity q
m
lh(c) is positive
whereas the planners quantity qolh(c) is zero.
Given (19), in the free market outcome the shares of ine¢ciently under-supplied and over-
supplied varieties (c
m=o
lh =c
m
lh = 2
k+1
k+2   1 and 1   c
m=o
lh =c
m
lh respectively) do not depend on country
characteristics and are thus the same for advantaged and disadvantaged destinations. What di¤ers
across destinations is, instead, the extent of the ine¢ciency in the distribution of quantities across
varieties supplied. To see this, consider two varieties that are supplied both in the free market and
in the planners outcomes with unit labor requirements c and c0 in [0; colh] and such that c < c
0 holds.
Using (6) and (18) to compare their relative quantities in the two outcomes yields
qmlh(c)
qmlh(c
0)
 
qolh(c)
qolh(c
0)
=  
(cmlh   c
o
lh) (c
0   c)
(cmlh   c
0) (colh   c
0)
: (27)
As this is negative and holds for any c and c0 in [0; colh], the distribution of quantities supplied by the
planner is always more skewed towards varieties with low unit labor requirement than the distribution
at the free market outcome. However, using (8), (19) as well as cmhh = 2
1
k+2 cohh to substitute for c
m
lh
in the right hand side of (27) and di¤erentiating the resulting expression with respect to cohh shows
that the ine¢ciency gap in the quantity ratio [qmlh(c)=q
m
lh(c
0)  qolh(c)=q
o
lh(c
0)] is an increasing function
of the cuto¤ cohh. This implies that the ine¢ciency in the distribution of quantities is more severe
in disadvantaged than in advantaged countries. Disadvantaged countries, therefore, not only produce
ine¢ciently larger shares of the varieties they design and import ine¢ciently larger shares of varieties
produced elsewhere, but they also feature a more ine¢cient product mix biased towards varieties with
higher unit labor requirements.
5.3 Product Range
The range of products consumed in country l are given by (13) and (23) for the free market and the
planner respectively. Given cmll = 2
1
k+2 coll, the resulting product range gap evaluates to
Nml  N
o
l =
 (k + 1)


2
k+1
k+2   1
 
coll
  1

:
As this is generally di¤erent from zero, in all countries the free market o¤ers an ine¢cient product
range. Moreover, Nml is smaller (larger) than N
o
l for c
o
ll > (<)

2
k+1
k+2   1

. The free market product
range is, therefore, ine¢ciently narrow (wide) for large (small) coll. Accordingly, the free market makes
too few varieties available in disadvantaged countries, and too many varieties available in advantaged
countries. This does not imply however that consumption of the modern good is ine¢ciently low in
the former and ine¢ciently high in the latter. Using (2), (6), (18), (19) and (21) to compute country
ls average quantities qmh and q
o
l consumed in the free market and e¢cient outcomes respectively, the
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gap in per-capita consumption of the modern good turns out to be
Nml q
m
l
Ll
 
Nol q
o
l
Ll
=  
2
1
k+2   1

coll:
As this is negative, in the free market outcome all countries consume an ine¢ciently low per-capita
amount of the modern good, the more so the larger coll. Hence, the under-consumption is more severe in
disadvantaged countries. The same holds for the average per-capita consumption of modern varieties
as the corresponding gap evaluates to
qml
Ll
 
qol
Ll
=  
1  2 
k+1
k+2
(k + 1)
coll: (28)
The fact that all individuals in all countries consume ine¢ciently little of the modern good implies
that the global supply of that good must be ine¢ciently small. Given qml = q
m
hl and q
o
l = q
o
hl for
all h, (28) also implies that in the free market outcome trade per capita is ine¢ciently low at the
intensive margin, especially for disadvantaged countries.22 Given Nhl = NE;hhl (cll=cM;h)
k
, (15) and
(24) imply that also the extensive margin of trade is ine¢ciently low towards these countries. It is,
however, ine¢ciently high towards advantaged countries.
5.4 International Inequality
There are nally implications in terms of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged
countries. Given (14), (25) and cmll = 2
1
k+2 coll, all countries enjoy higher welfare in the e¢cient outcome
than in the free market one (Uol > U
m
l ). However, the welfare gap U
o
l   U
m
l is a concave quadratic
function of coll (or equivalently c
m
ll ) since its derivative with respect to c
o
ll is positive (negative) for
small (large) coll.
23 This implies that even though in the free market outcome both disadvantaged and
advantaged countries su¤er from ine¢ciently low welfare levels, the welfare gap is smaller (larger) in
advantaged (disadvantaged) countries if their free market cuto¤s are di¤erent enough, that is, if their
di¤erences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough. In this case, the free
market provides an ine¢ciently high degree of welfare inequality between the two types of countries.
To see this, denote the e¢cient levels of welfare in advantaged and disadvantaged countries
by UoA and U
o
D respectively so that U
o
A   U
o
D > 0. Analogously, denote the free market levels of
welfare by UmA and U
m
D so that U
m
A   U
m
D > 0. The corresponding cuto¤s are related by c
m
A =
2
1
k+2 coA < c
m
D = 2
1
k+2 coD. Given that the welfare gap U
o
l   U
m
l is a concave quadratic function of the
e¢cient cuto¤, for any country l we can nd a threshold unit labor requirement comll  c
o
ll such that
the corresponding welfare gap equals the one attained at coll. Accordingly, when the e¢cient cuto¤s
for the two types of countries are such that coA < c
om
ll  c
o
D, the welfare gap is larger (smaller) in
disadvantaged (advantaged) countries: UoD   U
m
D > U
o
A   U
m
A . This is more likely to happen when
22The market average quantity produced in l and consumed in h is qm
lh
=
Z cmlh
0
qm
lh
(c)dGl(c)=Gl(c
m
lh
). Under the
distributional assumption (2), it evaluates to qm
lh
= Lh lhc
m
lh
=[2(k+1)] = Lhc
m
hh
=[2(k+1)] with the second equality
granted by (8). As this does not depend on the country of production l, we then have that it is also the average quantity
consumed in h : qm
h
= qm
lh
. Analogously, for the e¢cient outcome we get: qo
h
= qo
lh
= Lhc
o
hh
=[(k + 1)] .
23The same applies with respect to cm
ll
as cm
ll
= 2
1
k+2 co
ll
.
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coA and c
o
D are farther apart, that is, for larger di¤erences in market size, state of technology and
geography. As UoD U
m
D > U
o
A U
m
A can be equivalently written as U
m
A  U
m
D > U
o
A U
o
D, in that case
the free market provides an ine¢ciently high degree of welfare inequality between advantaged and
disadvantaged countries: improved e¢ciency goes hand in hand with reduced international inequality.
Vice versa, when di¤erences between countries are small, comll < c
o
A < c
o
D holds and improved e¢ciency
comes with increased international inequality.
Hence, when di¤erences between advantaged and disadvantaged countries in terms of market
size, state of technology and geography are large, the free market provides ine¢ciently high interna-
tional inequality. When such di¤erences are small, it provides ine¢ciently low international inequality.
5.5 Distortions and Externalities
The comparison between free market and e¢cient outcomes in terms of product selection, product
mix and product range shows that the free market errs in all three dimensions. First, as the share of
entrants that produce in equilibrium is larger than the share of varieties designed but not produced by
the planner, the free market is less selective than the planner. As the share of varieties produced but
not exported is smaller for the free market than the planner, ine¢ciently weak selection in equilibrium
a¤ects also exports. This ine¢ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged countries.
Second, as the supplied quantity of varieties with lower (higher) unit labor requirement is
smaller (larger) for the free market than the planner, the free market o¤ers a sub-optimal product
mix that is not skewed enough towards lower cost varieties. This holds for both locally produced
and imported varieties. A corollary is that, for given unit labor requirement, the free market product
basket gives ine¢ciently small weight to locally produced vs. imported varieties and, among these,
to varieties coming from close vs. distant countries (as, due to iceberg frictions, imported varieties
have higher delivered cost than locally produced ones, and imported varieties have higher delivered
cost from distant than close countries). Also this ine¢ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged
countries.
Third, the free market provides an ine¢ciently narrow (wide) range of varieties to disadvantaged
(advantaged) countries. Nonetheless, all countries consume an ine¢ciently low per-capita amount of
the modern good due to the dominant impact of ine¢ciently low average per-capita consumption of
varieties. These ine¢ciencies are again more severe in disadvantaged countries. As a corollary, the
fact that in all countries individual consumption of the modern good is ine¢ciently low implies that
also the global supply of that good is ine¢ciently low.
The source of ine¢ciency lies in four types of externalities (Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014;
Behrens et al, 2016; Dhingra and Morrow, 2019). Three of them are at work even in the absence
of rm heterogeneity and do not require MSLD. These are the ones highlighted in early models of
monopolistic competition (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stilglitz, 1977). On the one hand, love of variety
for the modern good implies that the product range enters utility as a direct argument on top of the
quantities consumed. This rst type of externality acts as a force tending towards too few varieties
since rms do not take into account their positive impact on the product range when deciding to enter
and serve any given market. On the other hand, there are two types of externalities that act as forces
tending towards too many varieties. By keeping price above marginal cost, rms leave more room
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for entry in the free market equilibrium than it would happen under (shadow) marginal cost pricing
associated with the planners outcome. Moreover, when rms enter the market, they do not consider
their negative impact on rivals prots.
In general, the net e¤ect on product range is ambiguous as it depends on the cross elasticities
of demand. A special case arises with CES demand. Without the traditional good, the opposite
externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market and e¢cient outcomes coincide. With
the traditional good (outside good), the free market still provides the e¢cient amount of each variety
but, due to markup pricing, an ine¢ciently small number of varieties. The modern good is, therefore,
under-supplied relative to the traditional one. The fact that CES implies the same markup for all
rms determines the e¢ciency of the product mix between locally produced and imported varieties
at the free market outcome. The introduction of rm heterogeneity does not alter these properties
(Melitz and Redding, 2015).
The fourth type of externality materializes, instead, in the presence of rm heterogeneity and,
crucially, MSLD. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is reected in
larger markups for rms with lower marginal cost so that these rms do not fully transmit their cost
advantage to prices.24 This generates a positive externality in favor of rms with higher marginal
cost. The externality works at the intensive margin: higher marginal cost rms are ine¢ciently large
relative to lower marginal costs rms. It also works at the extensive margin: by keeping price above
marginal cost more than higher marginal cost rivals, lower marginal cost rms leave ine¢ciently larger
room for entry. This applies both to domestic and foreign rivals. Hence, with MSLD but not with
CES, rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver of ine¢ciency.
A lower cuto¤ reduces these distortions. By reducing the prices of all rms but disproportion-
ately those of rms with lower marginal cost and larger markup, it forces these rms to trasmit more
of their cost advantage to prices.25 This explains why welfare is higher in advantaged countries where
sellers face lower cuto¤s.
6 Optimal Multilateral Policy
The analysis in the previous section has drawn a complex map of market failures. There are several
ways in which the free market outcome departs from the e¢cient outcome, in terms of product selec-
tion, product mix and product range. Moreover, the extent (and sometimes also the direction) of the
departures is country or rm specic. We will now characterize the tools that national policy makers
can use cooperatively to make the market achieve the e¢cient outcome in a decentralized fashion. For
this to happen, we will need to give the policy makers an unconstrained choice of tools (rst best),
including country-specic and variety/rm-specic consumption/production subsidies/taxes as well
as lump-sum transfers for consumers and rms. We will then comment on what policy makers could
achieve when deprived of the use of variety/rm-specic consumption/production subsidies/taxes
(second best) and also of lump-sum transfers for rms (third best).
24Recall that the markup on sales from h to l of a rm with marginal cost c is hl(c) =
 
cm
ll
  hlc

=2.
25Consider two rms selling from h to l with marginal costs c and c0 such that c < c0. Their relative price is
phl(c)=phl(c
0) =
 
cm
ll
+ hlc

=
 
cm
ll
+ hlc
0

, which is smaller than 1 and increasing in cm
ll
.
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6.1 First Best Policies
The e¢cient outcome can be decentralized through country-pair variety specic per-unit transfers
shl(c) subsidizing (taxing) trade of low (high) marginal cost varieties from country h to country l
(l = 1; :::;M), complemented by country-specic lump-sum taxes on rms prots in h and con-
sumers incomes. For international trade from h to l 6= h, per-unit subsidies can indi¤erently take the
form of export subsidies in the production country or import subsidies in the consumption country.
Analogously, per-unit taxes can indi¤erently be export taxes in the production country or import
tari¤s in the consumption country. For domestic trade within country h, per-unit transfers can indif-
ferently take the form of production subsidies (taxes) for local rms or consumption subsidies (taxes)
for local consumers. In any case, due to the externalities discussed in the previous section, free trade
is not e¢cient and restoring e¢ciency requires policy tools that vary across countries and rms. One
size does not t all.
6.1.1 Per-Unit Transfers
Per-unit transfers are needed to remove the product mix distortion. Consider quantity qhl(c) supplied
to country l by a rm producing in country h at marginal cost c. Let s&hl(c) and s

hl(c) denote per-unit
consumption and production transfers earmarked to that quantity. Given (3), (6), (4) and (5), the
revenue the rm earns on qhl(c) becomes

pmaxl + s
&
hl(c) 

Ll
qhl(c)

qhl(c) while the corresponding
total production cost becomes (hlc  s

hl(c)) qhl(c). The rms prot then becomes
shl(c) =

pmaxl + s
&
hl(c) 

Ll
qhl(c)  hlc+ s

hl(c)

qhl(c);
which shows that the distinction between per-unit consumption and production transfers is immaterial
from the perspective of prot maximization. Accordingly, for parsimony we introduce the bundling
notation shl(c)  s
&
hl(c) + s

hl(c). The prot-maximizing quantity then evaluates to
qshl(c) =
Ll
2
(pmaxl + shl(c)  hlc) ; (29)
which is non-negative as long as c is not larger than the cuto¤ cshl, i.e. the value of the marginal cost
such that
pmaxl = hlc
s
hl   shl(c
s
hl): (30)
The e¢cient outcome is achieved when the corresponding price
pshl(c) =
1
2
(pmaxl   shl(c) + hlc)
equals the delivered marginal cost hlc for c
s
hl = c
o
hl so that the after-transfer marginal delivered cost
is equalized across all sellers to l (level playing eld). This is the case for
shl(c) =  shl(c
o
hl) + hl (c
o
hl   c) : (31)
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As, given (30), shl(c
o
hl) = 0 identies the unique transfer schedule that allows for p
s
hl(c
o
hl) = hlc
o
hl,
(31) can be rewritten as
sohl(c) = hl (c
o
hl   c) : (32)
The e¢cient per-unit transfer is decreasing in marginal cost, being zero for rms with c = cohl, negative
(tax) for high marginal cost rms with c 2 (cohl; cM;h] and positive (subsidy) for low marginal cost
rms with c 2 [0; cohl). Hence, trade by low cost rms is subsidized whereas trade by high cost rms
is taxed. Equivalently, low cost varieties enjoy export or import subsidies whereas high cost varieties
face export taxes or import tari¤s. In both cases transfers are bigger for more distant shipments
(larger hl) to disadvantaged countries (larger c
o
hl).
For shipments to any given country l, the average per-unit transfer across all rms and countries
is
sol =
2k + 1
k + 1
coll;
which is larger for disadvantaged countries.26
6.1.2 Lump-Sum Transfers
Lump-sum transfers are needed to deal with the distortions in product selection and product range.
Let Sh be a lump-sum transfer for rms in country h. It is a subsidy if positive and a tax if negative.
Marginal cost pricing implies that producers make no prots so that all they eventually earn in excess
of marginal cost comes from per-unit subsidies. Accordingly, given (29), (30) and (32), the earnings
on quantity supplied to l by a rm producing in h at marginal cost c evaluate to
sohl(c)q
o
hl(c) =
Ll

(hl)
2
(cohl   c)
2
:
The free entry condition in country h can then be stated as
MX
l=1
"Z cohl
0
Ll

(hl)
2
(cohl   c)
2
dGh(c)
#
+ Sh = fh; (33)
which by (2) and (19) can be rewritten as
MX
l=1
h
(hl)
 k
Ll (c
o
ll)
k+2
i
=
 (k + 1) (k + 2) (fh   Sh) (cM;h)
k
2
:
26The average subsidy received by rms producing in h for sales to l is dened as so
hl
=
Z cohl
0
so
hl
(c)dGl(c)=Gl(chl),
which by (2) evaluates to so
hl
= [(2k+1)= (k + 1)]hlc
o
hl
. Given (19), this can be rewritten as so
hl
= [(2k+1)= (k + 1)]co
ll
and thus it does not depend on the country of production. Averaging across countries of production then obviously
gives so
l
= so
hl
.
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For l = 1; :::;M this yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium cuto¤s
coll =
8>>><
>>>:
 (k + 2) (k + 1)
Ll
MP
h=1
h
fh Sh
2 (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
jP j
9>>>=
>>>;
1
k+2
: (34)
Comparing (34) with (21) reveals that decentralization of the e¢cient outcome requires to set Sh =
 fh. Being negative, this amounts to a country-specic lump-sum tax on rm prot (T

h = fh),
which is higher in disadvantaged countries as these face higher innovation costs. Without the prot
tax, e¢cient per-unit transfers would generate expected earnings that are higher than the innovation
cost so that free entry would lead to a decentralized cuto¤ smaller than the e¢cient one. The lump-
sum transfers also implement the e¢cient numbers of entrants, producers and sellers in each country.
Given (30) and (29), shl(c
o
hl) = 0 implies p
max
l = c
o
ll. This, together with denition (5) and average
price pol = [k=(k + 1)]c
o
ll, yields the e¢cient number of entrants (23).
27 E¢ciency can also be gauged
from the fact that, as discussed in Section 4.3, the e¢cient number of sellers is alternatively given
by Nol =
PM
h=1 hlNE;h (c
o
ll=cM;h)
k
. Then, the derivation we followed for the free market outcome
implies that also the number of entrants is the e¢cient one NoE;l. The same holds for the number of
producers as this is given by NoP;l = N
o
E;l (c
o
ll=cM;l)
k
.
To close the characterization of e¢cient decentralization, we need to check whether the revenues
from the lump-sum taxes on rms prots together with those from the per-unit taxes on high marginal
cost rms are enough to nance the per-unit subsidies to low marginal cost rms. This can be done
by computing the aggregate net per-unit transfers across all rms and countries. These aggregate
transfers total
So 
MX
l=1
MX
h=1
Nolh
"Z colh
0
slh(c)q
o
lh(c)dGl(c)=Gl(c
o
lh)
#
= 2
MX
l=1
flN
o
E;l;
where the second equality is granted by the free entry condition (33) and the term between brackets is
the average transfer for quantities produced in l and sold in h.28 As So is positive, per-unit taxes do not
generate enough revenues to cover per-unit subsidies. Moreover, given T l = fl, S
o = 2
PM
l=1 flN
o
E;l
implies that aggregate net per-unit transfers
PM
l=1 T

l =
PM
l=1 fl are twice as large as aggregate tax
revenues from lump-sum taxes on rm prots. This decit can be nanced through an additional
lump-sum tax on consumers equal to T & =
PM
l=1 flN
o
E;l. Hence, the decit generated by per-unit
transfers is equally shared between producers and consumers. Note, however, that the payments of
lump-sum prot taxes are earmarked by production country whereas the distribution of the burden of
lump-sum consumption taxes is immaterial due to the absence of income e¤ects. The reason for this
di¤erence is that the former are used to correct distortions while the latter only for budget balance.29
27The average delivered price quoted by rms producing in h for sales to l is dened as po
hl
=Z cohl
0
po
hl
(c)dGl(c)=Gl(chl). By (2) this evaluates to p
o
hl
= [k= (k + 1)]hlc
o
hl
, which in turn by (19) can be rewrit-
ten as po
hl
= [k= (k + 1)]co
ll
. As this does not depend on the country of production, averaging across countries of
production gives po
l
= po
hl
.
28See footnote (26).
29Which countries run the bigger decit per capita before consumer taxation is not a well dened question as it is
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6.2 Second and Third Best Policies
The decentralization of the e¢cient outcome requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not
only across countries but also across varieties produced at di¤erent marginal cost. We now analyze
what is achievable when subsidies and taxes can vary across countries but not across shipments made
by rms between the same country pair. When this is the case, policy makers do not have enough
tools to remove all distortions. In particular, as they have to use the same per-unit transfer slh for all
shipments from country l to country h, they lack the specic tools needed to target the product mix
distortion.
In this second best scenario, policy makers implement the constrained optimal allocation of a
planner who cannot a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6). This planner thus
maximizes welfare (16), subject not only to the resource constraint (17) but also to the product mix
constraint (6), with respect to the choice variables q0l, NE;l and clh (instead of qlh(c)) for l; h = 1; :::;M .
Solving this maximization problem shows that constrained e¢cient product selection is ruled by the
cuto¤
ccoll =
8>>><
>>>:
4 (k + 2) (k + 1)
2
(2k + 1)Ll
MP
h=1
h
fh (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
jP j
9>>>=
>>>;
1
k+2
(35)
for h; l = 1; ::::;M , with the relation between domestic and foreign cuto¤s given once more by ccohl =
ccoll =hl. Prot maximization also determines the constrained e¢cient number of entrants as
N coE;l =
2 (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
MP
h=1
h
  2k+12k+2c
co
hh

(ccohh)
 (k+1)
jClhj
i
 jP j
; (36)
with associated number of producers N coP;l = N
co
E;l (c
co
ll =cM;l)
k
and product range
N col =
MX
h=1
hlN
co
E;h (c
co
ll =cM;h)
k
for h; l = 1; ::::;M .
The constrained e¢cient outcome exhibits similar properties as the free market and (uncon-
strained) e¢cient outcomes. In particular, also the constrained planner follows a cuto¤ rule: only
varieties with low enough marginal cost (c  ccolh) are produced in country h for consumption in coun-
try l. The cuto¤ marginal cost ccolh is lower in advantaged countries. Moreover, conditional on the
countries of production and consumption, varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied
in larger amounts, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in the country of consumption.
The cuto¤ is, however, larger for the constrained planner than for the free market out-
come and even larger than for the unconstrained planner: ccoll = [2 (k + 1) = (2k + 1)]
1
k+2 cmll =
[4 (k + 1) = (2k + 1)]
1
k+2 coll. This way the constrained planner partially compensates the product
mix distortion with larger consumption of the modern good. Accordingly, as shown in Appendix B,
indeterminate whether subsidies (taxes) should come in the form of export subsidies (taxes) in the country of origin or
import subsidies (taxes) in the country of destination.
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the constrained e¢cient outcome can be decentralized through a per-unit trade subsidy common to
all rms selling to the same given country l
scol =
1
2 (k + 1)
ccoll ; (37)
matched by a lump-sum prot tax common to all rms producing in the same given country h
equal to T coh = fh=(2k + 1) for all h; l = 1; :::;M . The per-unit trade subsidy is thus larger for
supplies to disadvantaged countries, which however face also higher lump-sum prot taxes due to
higher innovation costs.
Comparing the rst and second best policy tools reveals that the constrained e¢cient per-unit
trade subsidy scol is smaller than the average unconstrained e¢cient per-unit trade subsidy s
o
l . The
aggregate constrained e¢cient trade subsidy corresponding to (37) amounts to
Sco 
MX
l=1
MX
h=1
N colh
Z ccolh
0
scoh q
co
lh(c)dGl(c)=Gl(c
co
lh) =
k + 2
2k + 1
MX
l=1
flN
co
E;l;
which is k+ 2 times larger than aggregate revenues from lump-sum prot taxation as these are equal
to
PM
l=1 flN
co
E;l=(2k + 1). This implies that rms bear less than half of the subsidy burden with the
rest nanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers.
It is also interesting to analyze the situation that corresponds to the traditional second-best
problem in entry models without rm heterogeneity (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). In this case
policy makers have the tools needed to manipulate the number of entrants but not those that would
allow them to a¤ect rm behavior after entry due to the unavailability of lump sum transfers for
rms. They are therefore forced to take that behavior as given. For concreteness, we call this the
third best scenario, in which policy makers implement the optimal allocation of a planner who is not
only unable to a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6) and thus cannot remove
the product mix distortion, but is also unable to choose the cuto¤ to deal with the product selection
distortion. Specically, this third best planner maximizes welfare (16) with respect to q0l and NE;l
for l = 1; :::;M , subject not only to the resource constraint (17) and the product mix constraint (6)
but also to the free entry condition (9) as this condition, together with the relation between domestic
and foreign cuto¤s given once more by cmhl = c
m
ll =hl, imposes the free market cuto¤ (10) on the
planner. Solving this maximization problem yields the third best number of entrants
N ccoE;l =
2 (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
MP
h=1
h
  12
2k+3
k+2 c
m
hh

(cmhh)
 (k+1)
jClhj
i
 jP j
; (38)
with associated number of producers N ccoP;l = N
cco
E;l (c
m
ll =cM;l)
k
and product range
N ccol =
MX
h=1
hlN
cco
E;h (c
m
ll =cM;h)
k
for h; l = 1; ::::;M .
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As the third best outcome entails the same cuto¤ as the free market outcome, it shares the same
properties of the free market in terms of selection. However, comparing the two outcomes reveals that
in each country the number of entrants, the number of producers, the range of products sold and the
range of products exported are richer in the third best allocation than in the free market equilibrium,
whereas not only the cuto¤ but also individual and average quantities supplied by rms are the same
in the two outcomes. This way the third best planner partially compensates the product mix and
product selection distortions with richer product range of the modern good.
Just like the second best outcome, also the third best outcome can be decentralized through a
per-unit trade subsidy common to all rms selling to any given country l
sccol =
1
2 (k + 2)
cmll 8l = 1; ::::;M (39)
with no associated lump-sum prot tax levied in this case as this tool is not available.30 The third best
subsidy is larger for supplies to disadvantaged countries as these have larger cuto¤ cmll . Moreover, given
ccoll > c
m
ll , comparing (37) with (39) reveals that the per-unit trade subsidy is smaller in the third best
than in the second best outcomes: scol > s
cco
l . Together with s
o
l > s
co
l , that implies s
o
l > s
co
l > s
cco
l :
the third best subsidy sccol is smaller than the second best subsidy s
co
l and even smaller than the
average rst best subsidy sol .
Finally, the aggregate third best trade subsidy corresponding to (39) is given by
Scco 
MX
l=1
MX
h=1
N ccolh
Z cmlh
0
sccoh q
m
lh(c)dGl(c)=Gl(c
m
lh) =
1
2
MX
l=1
N ccoE;l fl;
which is totally nanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers as there are no lump-sum tools for rms.
7 Unilateral Deviation
We conclude our analysis by studying whether countries have any incentive to deviate unilaterally
from the (globally) e¢cient outcome and, if that were the case, how deviations would take place
depending on countries being advantaged or disadvantaged.
Specically, we consider the problem faced by a benevolent social planner in country l who
maximizes local welfare Wl = UlLl with Ul as in (1). This local planner takes as exogenously given
the endowment of labor, the endowment of the traditional good, the production technologies of the two
goods, the trade frictions and the innovation technology of the modern good. The local planner also
considers as exogenously given at their globally e¢cient values all foreign-related variables, including
the prices of imports but excluding the prices of modern exports and the bilateral trade ows between
country l and all the other countries h 6= l = 1; :::;M .
The local planner then solves
max
fq0l;NE;l;qll(c);qlh(c);qhl(c)gj
M
h6=l=1
W =
MX
l=1
UlLl (40)
30See Appendix B for additional details.
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subject to the countrys resource and technology constraints as well as the trade balance condition.
The resource and technology constraints together imply
q0l = q0l + Ll   flNE;l  NE;l
MX
h=1
Z cM;l
0
 lhcqlh(c)dGl(c)

+X0l; (41)
whereby the consumption of the traditional good equals the sum of its endowment, its local production
and its net imports X0l, which due to balanced trade must be matched in value by the net exports of
the modern good
X0l =
MX
h=1;h 6=l

NE;l
Z cM;l
0
plh(c)qlh(c)dGl(c) N
o
E;h
Z cM;h
0
phl(c)qhl(c)dGh(c)

; (42)
where the (shadow) price of the modern good is normalized to 1 by choice of numeraire and the
(shadow) prices of exported and imported modern varieties are denoted by plh(c) and phl(c) respec-
tively. The export (shadow) price plh(c) is related to the corresponding quantity by the inverse demand
curve
plh(c) = c
o
hh  

Lh
qlh(c); (43)
where the domestic cuto¤ cohh of foreign country h 6= l is taken as exogenously given at the globally
optimal level due the small country assumption. This holds also the number NoE;h of varieties designed
abroad as well as for the export (shadow) price phl(c) = p
o
hl(c) = hlc and the export cuto¤ c
o
lh from
h to l with cohh =  lhc
o
lh in light of (19).
The local planners problem can be solved by rst using (41), (42) and (43) to substitute q0l out
of (40) and then maximizing the resulting expression with respect to country ls domestic quantities
qll(c), imported quantities qhl(c), exported quantities qlh(c) and number of locally designed varieties
NE;l.
7.1 Product Mix
The rst order condition with respect to qhl(c) gives
quhl(c) =
(
Ll
 (c
u
ll   hlc) c  c
u
ll=hl with c
u
ll    
Qul
Ll
0 c > cull
(44)
where u labels the local welfare maximizing values of the variables and
Qul 
MX
h=1
 
NE;h
Z cull=hl
0
quhl(c)dGh(c)
!
:
The local planner thus follows a cuto¤ rule for imports: only varieties with low enough unit labor
requirement (c  cull=hl) are allowed into country l and, conditional on the country of origin, varieties
with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied in larger amounts than those with higher c, the more
so the lower the cuto¤ in country l. Quantity quhl(c) clears the market in a decentralized scenario
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only if the quantity of each variety produced in h and sold in l is priced at marginal delivered cost
puhl(c) = hlc.
31 Accordingly, puhl(c) does not deviate from p
o
hl(c) whereas q
u
hl(c) may deviate from
qohl(c) in (18) to the extent that the locally e¢cient cuto¤ c
u
ll deviates from the globally e¢cient cuto¤
coll in (10).
The rst order condition with respect to qll(c) gives
qull(c) =
(
Ll
 (c
u
ll   c) c  c
u
ll
0 c > cull
(45)
so that only varieties with low enough unit labor requirement (c  cull) are produced in country l for
domestic consumption: varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied in larger amounts
than those with larger c, the more so the lower the cuto¤ cull. Quantity q
u
ll(c) clears the market in
a decentralized scenario only if each producer in l prices the quantity sold domestically at marginal
cost pull(c) = c.
32 Accordingly, also pull(c) does not deviate from p
o
ll(c) whereas q
u
ll(c) may deviate from
qohll(c) to the extent that c
u
ll deviates from c
o
ll.
Results (44) and (45) together imply that the relation of the locally e¢cient cuto¤ for marginal
varieties consumed and produced in l with that for marginal varieties consumed in l but produced in
h is given by
cuhl =
cull
hl
: (46)
Hence, (44), (45) and (46) mirror the corresponding results (18) and (19) in the globally e¢cient
outcome, but with di¤erent cuto¤s.
The rst order condition with respect to qlh(c) gives
qulh(c) =
(
Lh
2 (c
o
hh    lhc) c  c
o
hh= lh with c
o
hh    
Qoh
Lh
0 c > colh
(47)
which implies that only varieties with low enough unit labor requirement (c  cohh= lh) are exported
from country l to country h and varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are exported in larger
amounts, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in country h. Result (47) also implies that the relation
of the (globally e¢cient) cuto¤ for marginal varieties consumed and produced in h with the locally
e¢cient one for varieties consumed in h but produced in l is regulated by
culh =
cohh
 lh
; (48)
which in turn implies culh = c
o
lh given (19). Substituting (47) into inverse demand (43) then yields
pulh(c) =
1
2
(cohh +  lhc) (49)
so that the locally e¢cient exported quantity qulh(c) clears the market in a decentralized scenario only
31This can be seen by substituting phl(c) = p
u
hl
(c) = hlc in the inverse demand function  analogous to (43) 
phl(c) =  qhl(c)=Ll Q
u
l
=Ll and using the denition c
u
ll
=  Qu
l
=Ll to obtain qhl(c) = q
u
hl
(c) =
 
cu
ll
  hlc

Ll=.
32This can be seen by substituting pll(c) = p
u
ll
(c) = c in the inverse demand function  analogous to (43)  pll(c) =
  qll(c)=Ll   Q
u
l
=Ll and using the denition c
u
ll
=   Qu
l
=Ll to obtain qll(c) = q
u
ll
(c) =
 
cu
ll
  c

Ll=.
26
if exports are priced above marginal cost with markup ulh(c) = p
u
lh(c)   lhc = (c
o
hh    lhc) =2. While
this mirrors the free market result with markup mlh(c) = (c
m
hh    lhc) =2 (see Section 3.1), the local
planners markup is smaller than the market one due to cohh < c
m
hh. Hence, p
u
lh(c) deviates from the
globally e¢cient price polh(c) =  lhc by a smaller extent than the free market price p
m
lh(c).
To recap, the local planners prices for modern exports to all destinations are above delivered
marginal costs and are thus higher than the global planners ones; locally e¢cient quantities exported
are, instead, below the globally e¢cient ones. Di¤erently, the local planners prices for domestic sales
and imports are equal to delivered marginal costs and thus coincide with the global planners ones.
Whether the corresponding quantities also coincide depends on whether the two planners domestic
cuto¤s in l are the same. Markup pricing on exports implies that a country that unilaterally deviates
from the globally e¢cient outcome exploits foreign love of variety in the modern good to extract rents
from its trading partners or, equivalently, to improve its terms of trade.
7.2 Product Selection
To nd the local planners optimal cuto¤ we have to look at the rst order condition with respect to
NE;l, which requires
Ll (c
u
ll)
k+2
+
1
2
MX
h6=l=1
lhLh (c
o
hh)
k+2
=  (k + 2) (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
fl: (50)
This can be compared with the analogous expression for the global planner (20) to express the local
planners optimal cuto¤ as
cull =
"
(coll)
k+2
+ (coall )
k+2
2
# 1
k+2
; (51)
where coll is the globally e¢cient cuto¤ (21) and c
oa
ll is the value it takes when country l is autarkic.
Country ls locally e¢cient cuto¤ cull is thus equal to a (geometric) average of its globally e¢cient
cuto¤ coll when the country is inserted in the trade network and its globally e¢cient cuto¤ c
oa
ll when
the country is excluded from the trade network. Then, given coll < c
oa
ll , we have c
o
ll < c
u
ll < c
oa
ll : the
locally e¢cient domestic cuto¤ lies above the globally e¢cient one so that varieties with marginal
cost c 2 (coll; c
u
ll] are supplied by the local planner but not by the global planner. This implies that,
while smaller quantities of varieties produced by country l are exported, larger quantities are sold
domestically (qull(c) > q
o
ll(c)). It also implies that larger quantities are imported (q
u
hl(c) > q
o
hl(c)). The
unilateral deviations for what globally e¢ciency would require are larger for advantaged countries.
Given coall = c
o
ll=Cll, the gap
cull   c
o
ll = c
o
ll
(
1 + (1=C)k+2
2
 1
k+2
  1
)
(52)
is larger for advantaged countries as their Cll is smaller.
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7.3 Product Range
As for the number of varieties sold (and thus the product range), we can exploit the denition of cull
from (44), the relation between cuhl and c
u
ll from (48), and the expression for Q
u
l obtained using (44)
and (45) together with (2) in its denition to get
Nul =
 (k + 1)

  cull
cull
: (53)
The locally e¢cient number of varieties sold in l also evaluates toNul = N
u
E;l (c
u
ll=cM;h)
k
+
PM
h6=l=1 hlN
o
E;h (c
u
ll=cM;h)
k
while the globally e¢cient number also evaluates toNol = N
o
E;l (c
o
ll=cM;h)
k
+
PM
h6=l=1 hlN
o
E;h (c
o
ll=cM;h)
k
.
These two expressions can be combined with (53) and (23) to obtain the locally e¢cient number of
varieties designed
NuE;l = N
o
E;l +
(k + 1) (cM;l)
k

"
  cull
(cull)
k+1
 
  coll
(coll)
k+1
#
with the corresponding locally e¢cient number of varieties produced in l for local or export sales
given by NuP;l = N
u
E;l (c
u
ll=cM;l)
k
and Nulh = N
u
E;l (c
u
lh=cM;l)
k
respectively. As in the globally e¢cient
outcome, also in the locally e¢cient outcome more varieties are sold (Nul is larger) in advantaged
countries as these have lower cull. However, given c
u
ll > c
o
ll, the locally e¢cient numbers of varieties
designed, produced and sold are smaller than the globally e¢cient ones: NuE;l < N
o
E;l, N
u
P;l < N
o
P;l
and Nul < N
o
l .
33 Based on (52), the gaps in these numbers between the local and global planners are
larger for advantaged countries.
Finally, indirect utility in the deviating country can be written as
Uul = 1 + q
"
0l +
1
2
(  cull)
2
+
1
 (k + 2) (k + 1)
(cull)
2
MX
h6=l=1
Nulh; (54)
which is higher that Uol by the revealed preference of the local planner. Comparing (54) with (25)
shows that the local planner more than compensate the loss in allocative e¢ciency captured by the
second term on the right hand side of (54) with the gain in foreign rent extraction captured by the
fourth term.
In summary, compared with the globally e¢cient outcome, fewer varieties are designed in the
deviating country l (NuE;l < N
o
E;l) and fewer varieties are exported (N
u
lh < N
o
lh) in smaller quantities
(qulh(c) < q
o
lh(c)) from l to any other country h 6= l. By contrast, more labor is allocated to expand
supply to domestic consumers (qull(c) > q
o
ll(c)), activating also the production of less productive
varieties (with c 2 (coll; c
u
ll]), even though the overall mass of varieties produced decreases (N
u
P;l <
NoP;l). In addition, more varieties are imported (N
u
hl > N
o
hl) in larger quantities (q
u
hl(c) > q
o
hl(c)),
activating also imports of less productive varieties (those with c 2 (cohl; c
u
hl]). Due to c
u
ll > c
o
ll labor
is disproportionately reallocated to the production of varieties with relatively high unit requirements
(qull(c)=q
u
ll(c
0) < qoll(c)=q
o
ll(c
0) and quhl(c)=q
u
hl(c
0) < qohl(c)=q
o
hl(c
0) for c < c0).
33By denition, we have Nl =
PM
h=1;h6=lNhl +NP;l. The number of imported varieties is N
u
hl
= No
E;h
 
cu
hl
=ch
M
k
>
No
hl
= No
E;h
 
co
hl
=ch
M
k
, which implies
PM
h=1;h6=lN
u
hl
>
PM
h=1;h6=lN
o
hl
. Then, given that Nu
l
< No
l
holds, it follows
that also Nu
P;l
< No
P;l
must hold.
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7.4 Deviant Policies
The policy tools needed to decentralize the locally e¢cient outcome can be determined through the
same logic followed to decentralize the globally e¢cient outcome in Section (6.1). Accordingly, the
locally e¢cient quantities of imports and domestic sales can be implemented at marginal cost pricing
by introducing per-unit transfers equal to
suhl(c) = hl (c
u
hl   c) = c
u
ll   hlc
and
sull(c) = c
u
ll   c (55)
respectively. For both domestic sales and shipments from any foreign country h, the average per-unit
transfer across all rms and countries is
sul =
2k + 1
k + 1
cull;
which is larger than in the globally e¢cient outcome for all countries and larger for disadvantaged than
advantaged countries. Di¤erently, the implementation of the locally e¢cient quantities of exports at
markup pricing does not require any active policy intervention as, for given cohh, rms by themselves
sell qulh(c) at price set price p
u
lh(c) under laissez-fair.
Implementing the locally e¢cient cuto¤ cull still requires active policy intervention in terms of
a lump-sum transfer Sf for rms. To see this, consider the free entry condition
Z cull
0
sull(h)q
u
ll(h)dGl(c) +
MX
h6=l=1
"Z colh
0
ulh(c)q
u
lh(c)dGl(c)
#
+ Sf = fl:
The rst term on the left hand side refers to the earnings that prospective entrants can expect on
domestic sales. As rms price at marginal cost, all earnings come in the form of per-unit subsidies.
The second term refers to prots gained on export sales thanks to markup pricing. Using (45), (47),
(49) and (55) together with (2) and ulh(c) = (c
o
hh    lhc) =2, a rms free entry condition can be
restated as
2Ll (c
u
ll)
k+2
+
1
2
MX
h6=l=1
lhLh (c
o
hh)
k+2
=  (k + 2) (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
(fl   Sf )
Comparison with (50) reveals that for cull to solve the free entry condition the lump-sum transfer must
be equal to
Sf =  
Ll (c
u
ll)
k+2
 (k + 2) (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
:
This is a lump-sum tax on prot that is larger in advantaged than disadvantaged countries.
Hence, the deviating countrys policies consist of a lump-sum prot tax, per-unit subsidies to
domestic sales and imports, and laissez-faire for exports.
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8 Conclusion
We have addressed the question how multilateral trade policy should be designed in a world in which
countries di¤er in terms of market access and technology, and rms with market power di¤er in terms
of productivity. We have argued that, in general, the answer depends on market structure, demand
characteristics and technological constraints. In the canonical models of monopolistic competition
with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs, xed production and constant marginal
costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across rms, the free market equilibrium is e¢cient. Ac-
cordingly, free trade is the best multilateral trade policy and there is no room for welfare improving
policy intervention.
This property of the free market equilibrium does not carry on to monopolistic competitive
models in which demand is not CES. We have argued that an important departure from CES materi-
alizes when demand satises Marshalls Second Law of Demand (MSLD), according to which demand
becomes more inelastic with consumption. We have shown that, in a model with linear demand sat-
isfying MSLD, the free trade allocation of resources is ine¢cient in terms of product range, product
selection and product mix, and that the extent of ine¢ciency varies across countries depending on
market size, state of technology and geography.
We have used the term disadvantaged to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse
state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and average production costs), and worse geography
(in terms of more pronounced remoteness from countries with better state of technology). We have
found that, from a global welfare viewpoint, optimal multilateral trade policy should act as follows.
On the one hand, to remove the product mix ine¢ciency, it should promote the sales of low cost rms
to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. It should also trim the sales of high cost rms
to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. On the other hand, to simultaneously remove
the product range and product selection ine¢ciencies, it should reduce rm entry in all countries,
but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore e¢ciency but also reduce welfare
inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries provided that their di¤erences in market
size, state of technology and geography are large enough.
Such an optimal trade policy requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not only across
countries but also across products supplied at di¤erent marginal cost. We have also analyzed what is
achievable in a restricted scenario in which subsidies and taxes vary across countries but not across
rms. In this case, the product mix ine¢ciency cannot be targeted specically and the resulting
constrained optimal trade policy should (partially) compensate the welfare loss due to the product
mix distortion with larger consumption of all products, especially in disadvantaged countries. When
the additional unavailability of lump sum tools for rms makes it impossible to target not only the
product mix distortion but also the product selection distortion the (even more) constrained optimal
trade policy should (partially) compensate the corresponding welfare losses with richer product variety,
especially in disadvantaged countries. Finally, we have shown that all countries have a unilateral
incentive to deviate from the optimal multilateral outcome in order to extract rents from their trading
partners or, equivalently, to improve their terms of trade. In doing so, advantaged countries impose
bigger allocative distortions to their own economies than disadvantaged countries do as the former
are able to extract more rents than the latter.
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9 Appendix A: Trade-Related Selection
To show that Cll < 1 holds with trade as long as there is some production of the modern good in all
countries, consider (12) and rearrange it as
1
jP j
MX
h=1
h
fh (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
= fl (cM;l)
k
(Cll)
k+2
=
Ll (c
m
ll )
k+2
2 (k + 1) (k + 2)
; (56)
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where the second equality is granted by (10). By construction, the cuto¤ cmll solves the system of M
free entry conditions (9), which can be restated as
MX
h=1
lh
Lh (c
m
hh)
k+2
2 (k + 2) (k + 1)
= fl (cM;l)
k
for l = 1; :::;M . Hence, by (56), fl (cM;l)
k
(Cll)
k+2
solves the system
MX
h=1
lhfh (cM;h)
k
(Chh)
k+2
= fl (cM;l)
k
(57)
for l = 1; :::;M . Rewrite (57) as
fl (cM;l)
k
(Cll)
k+2
+
MX
h6=l=1
lhfh (cM;h)
k
(Chh)
k+2
= fl (cM;l)
k
and then as
(Cll)
k+2
= 1 
MX
h6=l=1
lh
fh
fl

cM;h
cM;l
k
(Chh)
k+2
;
which shows that Chh > 0 8l = 1; :::;M implies Cll < 1 8l = 1; :::;M .
10 Appendix B: Derivation of Second and Third Best Policies
In the second and third best scenariosdiscussed in Section 6.2, policy makers implement the optimal
allocations of planners constrained to use a per-unit production subsidy common to all shipments
from any given country h to any other country l. If we use srhl with r = co and r = cco to denote such
subsidy in the second and the third best scenarios respectively, the subsidized prot of a rm with
marginal cost c supplying quantity qrhl(c) from h to l is
rhl(c) =

pmaxl + s
r
hl  

Ll
qrhl(c)  hlc

qrhl(c);
with prot-maximizing subsidized quantity
qrhl(c) =
Ll
2
(pmaxl + s
r
hl   hlc) : (58)
For given subsidy, the choke price pmaxl pins down the highest marginal cost c
r
hl such that q
r
hl(c) is
non-negative:
pmaxl = hlc
r
hl   s
r
hl: (59)
Accordingly, (58) can be restated as
qrhl(c) =
(
Ll
2 hl (c
r
hl   c) c  c
r
hl
0 c > crhl
(60)
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with corresponding prot-maximizing subsidized price
prhl(c) =
1
2
(pmaxl   s
r
hl + hlc) ; (61)
and maximized prot
rhl(c) =
Ll
4
(hl)
2
(crhl   c)
2
:34 (62)
Expression (60) implies that country ls domestic cuto¤ crll (such that q
r
ll(c
r
ll) = 0) and any
other country hs export cuto¤ crhl to l (such that q
r
hl(c
r
hl) = 0) are related by c
r
hl = c
r
ll=hl. Then,
(59) in turn implies pmaxl = c
r
ll   s
r
hl and p
max
l = c
r
ll   s
r
ll so that we have
srhl = s
r
ll (63)
and all rms selling to a given country receive the same subsidy for local sales, which we henceforth
denote by srl .
The number Nrl of rms selling to h can be found by noting that, by (5), we have
pmaxl =
1
Nrl + 
(+ Nrl p
r
l ) ; (64)
with average price
prl =
2k + 1
2 (k + 1)
crll   s
r
l ; (65)
as (2), (61), crhl = c
r
ll=hl and s
r
hl = s
r
l together imply that the average price set in l by rms producing
in h is the same for all h = 1; :::;M . Substituting pmaxl = c
r
ll   s
r
l and p
r
l from (65) into (64) yields
Nrl =
2 (k + 1)

(  crll + s
r
l )
crll
: (66)
Finally, the number of entrants can be determined as follows. By denition, given (2), crhl =
crll=hl, N
r
hl = N
r
E;h (c
r
hl=cM;h)
k
and Nl =
PM
h=1Nhl, the equilibrium number of sellers to l is N
r
l =PM
h=1 hlN
r
E;h (c
r
ll=cM;h)
k
. This expression can be combined with (66) to obtain a system of M linear
equations for l = 1; :::;M that can be solved for the equilibrium number of entrants
NrE;l =
2 (k + 1) (cM;l)
k
MP
h=1

( crhh+s
r
h)
(crhh)
k+1 jClhj

 jP j
: (67)
10.1 Second Best
The implementation of N coE;l requires setting a per-unit subsidy s
r
hjr=co in all countries such that N
co
E;l
in (36) coincides with NrE;l

r=co
in (67):
MX
h=1
"
(  ccohh + s
co
h )
(ccohh)
k+1
jClhj
#
=
MX
h=1
2
4

  2k+12k+2c
co
hh

(ccohh)
k+1
jClhj
3
5 :
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This holds for
scoh =
1
2 (k + 1)
ccohh;
which corresponds to expression (37) in Section 6.2.
The implementation of ccohh requires setting a lump-sum prot tax T
co
h in all countries such that
ccohh solves the free entry condition
MX
l=1
"Z ccohl
0
Ll
4
(hl)
2
(ccohl   c)
2
dGh(c)
#
= fh + T
co
h ;
which, by (2) and ccohl = c
co
ll =hl, can be rewritten as
MX
l=1
h
hlLl (c
co
ll )
k+2
i
= 2 (cM;h)
k
(k + 2) (k + 1) (fh + T
co
h )
for h = 1; :::;M . This yields a system of M equations that can be solved to nd the M equilibrium
cuto¤s
ccoll =
8>>><
>>>:
2 (k + 2) (k + 1)
Ll
MP
h=1
h
(cM;h)
k
(fh + T
co
h ) jChlj
i
jP j
9>>>=
>>>;
1
k+2
: (68)
Accordingly, the prot tax T coh that makes (68) coincide with (35) solves
MX
h=1
h
(cM;h)
k
(fh + T
co
h ) jChlj
i
=
2 (k + 1)
2k + 1
MX
h=1
h
fh (cM;h)
k
jChlj
i
and it is therefore equal to
T coh =
fh
2k + 1
as stated in Section 6.2.
10.2 Third Best
The implementation of N ccoE;l requires setting a per-unit subsidy s
r
hjr=cco in all countries such that
N ccoE;l in (38) coincides with N
r
E;l

r=cco
in (67) given cccohl = c
m
hl:
MX
h=1
"
(  cmhh + s
cco
h )
(cmhh)
k+1
jClhj
#
=
MX
h=1
8<
:
h
  2k+32(k+2)c
m
hh
i
(cmhh)
k+1
jClhj
9=
; ;
This is the case for
sccoh =
1
2 (k + 2)
cmhh;
which corresponds to expression (39) in Section 6.2.
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